Case study ยท Identity, endpoint and access cutover

Taking security back in-house: an MSP exit on a 30-day clock

An outsourced IT and SOC provider held admin access across identity, the password vault, device management, the network and monitoring, and its contract was about to end. I led the consulting team that took that access back in one weekend, without an outage and with an evidence trail an auditor can follow.

Facundo Montefalcone, security lead. Client and provider names and open findings are withheld.
19Systems with provider admin access revoked
1Weekend cutover
7Engineers rotating in parallel
0Hosts left with legacy remote tools
19Evidence artifacts, SHA-256 verified
30 dSoft-delete window

Context

A mid-sized US company, sister organization of a fintech client, had outsourced IT and security monitoring to one provider for years. The fleet is almost entirely macOS on Apple silicon. New leadership decided to bring security in-house.

The provider contract ended about 30 days after formal notice. Its device-management tenant, monitoring billing and compliance tooling ended with it. I was security lead on a 7-person consulting team in Q4 2026.

The problem

Nobody had the full list

Access had accumulated over years across about 27 business applications, 10 of them core. There was no single record of what the provider could reach.

Order decides the outcome

Rotate credentials in the wrong order and you lock out your own team, or leave a live session on the layer you have not reached yet.

Hidden dependencies

Cutting off a provider also cuts off what it quietly ran: the MDM tenant, log retention and compliance evidence.

How I ran it

  1. DiscoverAudited the shared password vault entry by entry. Years of history were split by period across the team so it finished in days. I used an LLM to categorize the export, then verified by hand, and built the application inventory alongside it.
  2. Access matrixOne sheet, one row per application: provider accounts, roles, how they authenticate, status. It became the single source of truth for the client and the team.
  3. Runbook and GanttA step-by-step rotation runbook with owners, order, rollback and a communication plan. Rule: credential changes are announced to their owners before rotation, never after.
  4. Cutover weekend7 engineers rotated admin credentials and MFA factors in parallel: vault administrators first, then identity provider, network, MFA recovery channels, then SaaS.
  5. Revoke and removeProvider accounts suspended and roles stripped under a 30-day soft-delete policy to preserve audit trails. Legacy remote-management agents uninstalled by MDM script, then verified by policy: 0 hosts remaining.
  6. Monitor and provePost-cutoff anomaly monitoring, a hunt for leftover persistence such as scheduled tasks, and a chain-of-custody log of 19 artifacts with SHA-256 hashes.

Deliverables
Consolidated access matrix, credential-rotation runbook, Gantt, provider deactivation tracker, chain-of-custody evidence log, post-cutover action plan with architecture evaluations.

Why the order matters

LayerActionReason
Password vaultRemove provider administrators firstEvery other secret lives here
Identity providerRotate administrators, revoke provider usersIt is the control plane for everything federated
Network edge and wirelessRotate device admin passwords, remove provider source addresses and admin usersCloses the path that does not depend on single sign-on
MFA recovery channelsMove shared second factors to client-owned numbers and channelsStops account recovery from undoing the rotation
SaaS and collaboration suiteSuspend accounts, strip roles, soft deleteKeeps ownership and audit history intact
EndpointsUninstall remote-access agents by MDM, verify by policyRemoves the last interactive path

Decisions after the cutover

Taking the keys back was half the job. Each service the provider had been running needed a new home before the contract ended.

AreaBeforeDecisionTrade-off I flagged
Device managementOpen-source MDM hosted in the provider tenant, expiring with the contractInterim self-hosted instance on a managed PaaS (MySQL, Redis, encrypted object storage), then consolidation into the parent organization's Apple MDMVendor export plus re-enrollment of every device
MonitoringSeparate observability platform billed through the providerConsolidate into the EDR vendor's SIEM and let the old contract lapseExport and back up logs first: SOC 2 needs the retention
Enterprise browserLegacy secure-browser product with unclear licensingManaged Chrome EnterpriseLost download-encryption controls, covered with the EDR browser extension
Compliance toolingGRC platform under the provider contractExport all evidence and move to the parent organization's toolingConfirm full deletion on the provider side
Endpoint detectionStandalone tenantSub-tenant under the parent, after assessing exposure management, prevention policies, device control and host firewallSome prevention settings held back until scripts were tested
IdentityApplications signing in with local accountsFederate about 27 applications through the identity provider, 10 core firstTwo to three weeks, estimate padded on purpose

What I would tell the next team

Start with the vault

If the provider can still read the vault, every rotation after it is theatre.

Announce before you rotate

Owners hear about a credential change before it happens. Surprise lockouts cost more trust than they save time.

Soft delete during notice

Suspend and strip roles. Hard deletion waits until the audit trail has been exported.

Minutes after every meeting

In a handover the written record is a control. I sent minutes after every call.

Stack

Identity
OktaGoogle Workspace
Secrets
1Password
Endpoint
CrowdStrike FalconFleetDMJamf
Monitoring
DatadogFalcon SIEM
Network
Next-generation firewallCloud-managed switching and wireless
Method
Access matrixRunbookGanttChain of custodySHA-256
Client, provider, staff and vendor contact names, addresses, configurations and open findings are withheld. Figures come from my own working records.